The present invention relates to systems for distributing digital content, and more specifically to methods and apparatuses for improving the security of systems for distributing digital content.
Introduction
Systems that protect valuable content require effective security. For content distributed in physical form, such as film being transported to movie theaters, physical security measures can be sufficient. Unfortunately, traditional physical security techniques are slow, expensive, cumbersome, and cannot be used with non-physical content distribution models. As a result, content providers rely on cryptographic hardware to ensure that only authorized users can access their data.
To prevent misuse of decryption keys, cryptographic hardware used to manage content decryption keys must be tamper-resistant. Building effective tamper resistant hardware has proven extremely difficult, especially for systems that are the subject of determined attacks, because they are large or protect high-value content. As a result, many systems (including most satellite television systems) use replaceable security devices, such as smartcards, so that security can be re-established after an attack without replacing the entire playback system. Nevertheless, smartcards used for prepaid telephone, pay-TV, and transit applications are broken regularly. For example, prepaid telephone cards used in Germany were attacked in 1998 with estimated losses of US$38 million (xe2x80x9cPirates Cash in on Weak Chips,xe2x80x9d Wired News, May 22, 1998). Similarly, access cards and systems for cable and prepaid satellite television services are regularly xe2x80x9chacked,xe2x80x9d necessitating repeated costly card replacements.
Smartcards must resist a variety of attacks against cryptographic algorithms, protocols, software, and chip hardware. Unfortunately, designing a smartcard that implements sophisticated protocols yet contains no security flaws has proven to be a very difficult task, since unexpected problems or errors in any portion of the design can render the entire card insecure. Cost considerations also favor attackers, since smartcards typically cost between $1 and $15, yet may be trusted to protect services or information worth thousands of dollars.
A smartcard system will only be attacked seriously if it is in the attacker""s interest to break it. With smartcard designs of the background art, once attackers develop a means to compromise one card, the incremental cost to break a large number of cards is usually very small. As a result, smartcard security efforts typically focus on preventing the initial attack by making the card more difficult to break. For example, vendors try to increase the cost of reverse-engineering the device or imaging the card""s ROM. Such techniques are helpful because they increase the cost required to break the system the first time, but for very large systems they are ineffective because attackers will devote enough effort to attacks that they will eventually succeed.
Prepayment and Post-Payment
In many systems of the background art, digital content is distributed in encrypted form. Access to the keys or algorithms required to decrypt the content is regulated by a rights management system that enforces the content owner""s access policies. These access policies vary greatly in complexity. For example, the simplest schemes simply involve providing a decryption key upon payment, while the approaches described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,915,019 to Ginter et al. provide for rather sophisticated and flexible distribution mechanisms.
The two most common payment methods present in such schemes are prepayment and post-payment. Because these approaches have different security requirements, their architectures and typical requirements will be described separately.
In prepayment schemes, the user obtains prior authorization from the content provider. In typical prepayment systems, the user provides a payment (or a commitment to pay) then receives a content decryption key that allows access to the purchased content.
Prepayment systems must be able to resist a variety of attacks. One class of attacks involves directly breaking the encryption (or any other protection mechanisms used to prevent unauthorized use of the content). Another attack involves capturing and redistributing the digital content after it has been decrypted. Other attacks involve unauthorized redistribution of the content decryption keys. Still other attacks involve capturing the content in analog form (e.g., as it is presented to the user).
Some of these attacks can be prevented effectively and others do not present a serious financial threat to content distributors. Strong encryption algorithms (such as triple DES) can reliably thwart attackers who do not have the correct decryption keys. Attacks against the decrypted content are not very serious if the content""s value decreases rapidly with time or if the re-recording process significantly degrades the quality of the content. Watermarking techniques can also prevent, detect or trace some content recording attacks. Attacks that involve copying decryption keys are serious and have proven challenging to prevent. Because it is usually impossible or too expensive to transmit a different ciphertext to each potential user, attackers can purchase a decryption key once, then redistribute it to unauthorized parties.
Systems known in the background art distribute content decryption keys in encrypted form to a tamper-resistant cryptographic unit connected to (or part of) the user""s playback device. Because decryption keys with long-term value are never exposed in unencrypted form, many attacks can be preventedxe2x80x94if the tamper-resistant module is unbreakable.
Because smartcards and other tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware commonly used to implement the cryptographic unit often have limited performance and bandwidth, the cryptographic unit is often used to generate short-lived subkeys from the main content decryption key. These subkeys are then transmitted to a less secure portion of the system, such as the main playback device, and used to decrypt the content itself.
The security of the system thus depends on the security of the cryptographic unit. If the cryptographic unit is compromised, attackers can determine the decryption keys and algorithms and use these to access content without authorization (e.g. by emulating an authorized cryptographic unit and/or the entire playback device).
In post-payment schemes, the user can decide to access some content without notifying the content provider or obtaining permission in advance. Instead, the content provider later audits the user""s usage and determines the appropriate fees to charge. In some systems of the background art, post-payment is referred to as pay-per-view.
In addition to being susceptible to the attacks described above against prepayment systems, post-payment schemes are vulnerable to a variety of additional attacks. For example, the user""s purchase audit records must be stored until the content provider retrieves them. Modification or destruction of these records can make it impossible for the content provider to determine the correct amount to charge. As a result, secure storage is required in the cryptographic unit for the audit data.
Although cryptographic techniques can secure the audit data from tampering (provided that the cryptographic unit has not been compromised), users generally do have the ability to prevent the audit process altogether. For example, in many consumer systems, two-way communication requires a telephone call, which users can prevent by simply disconnecting the telephone line. Users can often even destroy the cryptographic unit to conceal their purchases. As a result, measures are generally required to make users allow audits. For example, it is possible to penalize users by terminating service or preventing access to additional post-payment (pay-per-use) content if successful audits are not performed in a timely manner. Back-end systems can also charge users with penalties or other fees for audit noncompliance.
Post-payment systems involve more risk because purchases occur without live interaction with the content provider. As a result, each cryptographic unit must be preprogrammed with the cryptographic keys for viewing all content the user might possibly purchase. As a result, compromise of a single cryptographic module can potentially compromise all post-payment content in a system.
Many systems combine prepayment and post-payment approaches. Prepayment is generally used to regulate access to content sold on a subscription basis. For example, access to electronic news services, music channels, subscription television channels, etc. are commonly sold on a prepayment basis. Premium content is often provided on a post-payment (pay-per-use) basis, where users can use content at any time but their cryptographic modules periodically provide the content provider with a list of the premium content that has been used. Post-payment of this type is used in the xe2x80x9cDivxxe2x80x9d video playback system as well as most cable and satellite television xe2x80x9cpay-per-viewxe2x80x9d schemes. Prepayment protocols can be used for extremely high value pay-per-view content if penalties are insufficient to ensure successful auditing or if the risks are great enough to offset the cost and effort to initiate two-way communication with the content provider before access is authorized.
The Cryptographic Rights Unit (CRU)
A variety of designs and architectures have been proposed and used for cryptographic units that manage and protect the secret keys and algorithms used in content distribution systems. If legitimate users can be trusted to protect their keys, software-only approaches can be acceptable and have the advantage of avoiding the cost and expense of building and distributing specialized hardware. In many cases, however, tamper-resistant modules are required.
No architecture can provide perfect security. For example, an exact replica of an authorized satellite television receiver (including the receiver""s cryptographic rights unit) will be able to view the same signals as the original. As a result, the security depends on preventing attackers from building working copies or emulators of authorized playback devices.
Commercially-deployed approaches usually use tamper-resistant hardware modules to enforce the content provider""s access policies. FIG. 1 shows a smartcard of the background art for regulating access to encrypted content. The exemplary system includes three types of memory 110: ROM 115, EEPROM 125, and RAM 120. Each type of memory has advantages and disadvantages. ROM is fast and inexpensive, but cannot be modified and can often be read using advanced imaging techniques. RAM is fast and can be updated quickly, but loses its contents when power is lost. EEPROM retains its contents even when power is disconnected, but is relatively expensive to manufacture and is quite slow to modify.
The ROM and/or EEPROM generally include software, which is executed by microprocessor 140. The software includes instructions that implement and/or manage protocols and cryptographic keys involved in decrypting content. Because cost, memory, and I/O bandwidth limits make it difficult to decrypt a large amount of data in the tamper-resistant module, the tamper-resistant module can supply content decryption keys for individual blocks or streams of content to the playback system, which performs the bulk data decryption. A cryptographic processor 150 can optionally assist with the cryptographic computations by reducing the amount of time or program code required for the computation or by implementing obfuscated algorithms that are difficult to reverse engineer.
To support both prepayment and post-payment, at least four basic operations are supported over I/O interface 145: adding new prepaid rights keys or privileges, recording purchases (for post-payment), deriving content decryption keys (for either prepayment or post-payment), and post-payment auditing.
The device of FIG. 1 can potentially be attacked in a variety of ways. Attackers typically begin by extracting the software code from one device using any of a wide variety of techniques, such as physically imaging a chip or modifying a target chip using ion beam lithography. Although many techniques for performing the ROM and/or EEPROM extraction are relatively expensive, the operation only has to be performed once, since all units in the system normally have the same or similar software. Some techniques, such as tamper-resistant chip coatings, memory encryption, etc. can complicate memory extraction attacks, but such techniques are expensive to implement and only increase the cost for performing the software extraction.
Once the software is known, attackers can reverse engineer the code, yielding all cryptographic algorithms and keys contained in the extracted regions. Again, some techniques, such as the use of obfuscated or nonstandard software, can complicate this process somewhat.
If cryptographic processor 150 is not present, the attacker can then produce an emulator of the target device. Once an emulator has been developed, it is often difficult for the provider of the system to re-establish security without replacing all CRUs. Even if legitimate devices are configured to allow updates to the portions of their software or keys in EEPROM, the emulator will simply accept the same updates and continue operating unless the content provider manages to identify the compromised keys and stop providing service to the corresponding accounts.
If the emulator is imperfect and legitimate devices are configured to allow software updates, it may be possible to modify legitimate devices in a way that the emulator will not process correctly. Unfortunately, all the attacker has to do is correct the emulator. For example, pirates have produced CRU emulators that operate a personal computer and updated their emulator software to fix any errors in the emulator""s operation.
Code update capabilities are a double-edged swordxe2x80x94although they can thwart some attacks, attackers may be able to subvert them to inject malicious code into legitimate devices. Although code updates can be protected with digital signatures and/or MACs (Message Authentication Codes), attacks against the hardware, software, and/or cryptography pose a significant risk. It may also be possible for attackers to insert code in other ways, for example by exploiting pointer errors to redirect memory updates to code regions.
For example, if the attacker is able to trick microprocessor 140 into executing malicious (i.e., attacker-written) code, then the attacker can use the first code to load more malicious code into EEPROM 125 or RAM 120. This malicious code can then further modify the device, for example by adding unauthorized functions that bypass non-cryptographic protections delete post-payment audit records, add/modify/output cryptographic keys such as rights keys, etc. Although some techniques (such as hashing EEPROM contents as part of key derivation processes) have been attempted to detect some such attacks, these techniques tend not to be very effective and have been evaded by clever attackers. Although it would be possible to make microprocessor 140 execute only code from ROM 115, the system designers would then be unable to patch problems or transmit code updates to address bugs.
It is extremely difficult or impossible to reliably prevent all major attacks using architectures of the background art. Once attackers reverse engineer the software executed by microprocessor 140, they can identify and exploit software flaws or other implementation weaknesses. If these weaknesses in turn allow unauthorized modification of the device""s software, the content provider""s own cryptographic rights units (CRUs) and/or playback hardware can even be used to attack the system. The book European Scrambling Systems 5 by John McCormac (Baylin Publications, 1996) contains more information about how some existing systems have been designed and attacked and why architectures of the background art have proven ineffective.
Using architectures of the background art; any weakness in the cryptographic unit thus tends to cause a serious compromise of the entire device. Building a device that resists all known invasive and non-invasive hardware attacks, software attacks, protocol attacks, cryptographic attacks, fault induction attacks, etc. is extremely difficultxe2x80x94and new attacks may be discovered after a device is deployed. As a result, many content providers suffer from high piracy rates and the expense of replacing cryptographic units when they are broken.
The present invention can improve the security of systems used to distribute and protect digital content. One embodiment of the invention, in a tamper-resistant device for regulating access to encoded digital content, includes an external interface, a microprocessor for controlling the external interface, a memory, a cryptographic unit connected between the microprocessor and memory configured to protect the memory from the microprocessor by cryptographically transforming data communicated between the microprocessor and the memory, and a device key accessible by the cryptographic unit and inaccessible by the microprocessor. The device is configured such that the cryptographic unit uses the contents of the memory to transform at least one data value received from the microprocessor, where the result of the transformation is required to decode the digital content.
Although it is impossible to design a content distribution system that is immune to all possible piracy attacks, the main objective of the present invention is to minimize the probability that attackers will profit from attacks. A system does not need to be immune to all attacks; attackers are generally rational and driven by a profit motive, so illogical attacks will not proliferate widely. For example, if the attacker""s cost and risk exceed the cost of purchasing the content legitimately, piracy is not a serious threat.
Attackers have both advantages and disadvantages as compared to legitimate service providers. Because their acts are often illegal, they incur higher risks. Their distribution costs and customer acquisition costs tend to be higher, since they generally cannot use traditional (legitimate) channels. The quality and reliability of pirate services also tends to be inferior. On the other hand, attackers have several major advantages. Most important, they obtain their content for free (i.e., by pirating it). In many cases they also co-opt part or all of a content provider""s distribution channel (e.g., sales of encrypted optical discs, satellite broadcasts, Internet services, etc.), playback mechanisms (cable TV set-top boxes, DVD players, etc.), and other infrastructure. Finally, pirates"" customers may be able to avoid cumbersome procedures imposed by the legitimate content provider for security, billing, etc.
Although attacker business models vary, the present invention is based on the premise that content providers can effectively eliminate piracy by making it unprofitable. It is thus an objective of the present invention to increase the costs and risks incurred by attackers who steal content.
The present invention is also based on the premise that content providers will only invest in anti-piracy measures that make business sense. When estimating the cost of content piracy to content providers, several factors that must be considered. Direct revenue losses occur when potential subscribers instead buy pirated content. In cases where content providers subsidize the costs of media, distribution, playback hardware, technical support, etc., illegitimate users can also increase expenses. If piracy is widespread, content providers may be unable to obtain premium content or will have to pay more to content owners to compensate them for lost royalties. Costs for enforcement and prosecution can also be significant. Paying users may even feel discouraged if they see others getting for free what they are paying for, reducing the perceived value of a service. It is thus a primary objective of the present invention to achieve improved security without unduly increasing costs or hassles for content providers or legitimate users.
Traditional content protection schemes generally seek to maximize the cost of any unauthorized access, but do little to increase the cost of decoding messages once the decryption scheme has been broken. In addition to preventing attacks the present invention also seeks to minimize the proliferation of unauthorized decoding devices if an attack does occur, since the damage due to piracy increases with the number of unauthorized users. It is thus an objective of the present invention to maximize the cost of producing multiple unauthorized pirate devices even after one device has been compromised. This objective is attained in part by forcing attackers to repeat complex and expensive physically-invasive attacks for each pirate device that is produced.